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Response
Emily S. Rosenberg
Michael Ledeen has, for some time, been a strategic theorist influential in neoconservative Republican circles. He has recently advocated
regime change in Iran, an agenda pressed in his Roundtable essay
and elaborated in his numerous other publications. “Iraq is only one
theater in a regional war,” he wrote in a National Review article. The
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq represent, in his calculus, only the
first and second installments in the “regional war” that he says should
encompass Iran, Syria, and Lebanon as well. He has deplored President George Bush’s failure to quickly spread “freedom” to Iran, as Iran,
not Iraq, should be the central target of the United States. The road
to Tehran should have run through Baghdad, not stopped there. Had
the U.S. supported the pro-democracy demonstrations in Iran right
after the Afghani war, he claims, we probably could have unseated
the regime: “I do not think we would have needed a single bomb or a
single bullet.”1 Even now, with all the hostility U.S. actions in Iraq have
produced in the Islamic world, he still contends that military force
would not be needed to unseat the government in Iran. U.S.-supplied
money, equipment like satellite phones, radios, and television stations,
he promises in his Roundtable essay, will embolden the pro-democracy
forces to rise against the clerics. These goodies should be accompanied,
of course, by unambiguous tough talk by the U.S. president about
supporting democracy and freedom. Ledeen seems to promise easy
regime change, little cost, and vast popular support without a backlash
or Iraqi-style insurgency.
Dr. Ledeen sets these recommendations about “regional war”
within a historical framework that presents the history of the United
States as that of an “exceptional” power. The title of his essay, “The
American Mission,” and the opening paragraph asserting that the U.S.
is “different” from other powers announces that he adheres to that
long-analyzed and critiqued perspective that historians call “American
exceptionalism,” a view that Niall Ferguson debunked in his essay.
Ledeen does not enter, even in his footnotes, the large scholarly discussion over “exceptionalist” ideology; he simply asserts exceptionalism
as an unchallenged truth of history.2
His essay presents two problems: it advances a dubious narrative of
U.S. history and it urges an unrealistic policy in the name of realism.
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*****
Cast within a frame of American exceptionalism, Ledeen presents
recent world history as one long unfolding of a U.S.-led expansion of
freedom. Advancing a textbook example of classic imperial ideology,
he envisions a universalization of American values and practices that
will serve both the United States and the world.3 This exceptional mission is “part of our national DNA” or “national genome.” Naturalizing
political power by invoking biological metaphors is a characteristic
move of imperial ideologies.
In his view, U.S. history not only charts a providential course, but
U.S. policy oscillates between impulses exemplified by George Washington (the impulse of noninvolvement in foreign affairs) and Thomas
Jefferson (the impulse of exporting democracy). Such a formulation
allows Ledeen to wear, of all things, a Jeffersonian mantle. Should we
support the spread of “freedom” to Iran?, he asks. “Just ask Tom Jefferson,” he answers. He does not explain how we might engage in that
conversation or for what purpose. Frankly, I’m skeptical of historical
“channeling” or of cultural ventriloquism, not to mention the concept
of a national DNA. My objections to his essay, however, are far broader
than the skepticism arising from such dramatic flourishes.
Although Washington and Jefferson staked out rival positions on foreign policy in the late 18th century—one siding with the Federalists in
their pro-British leanings and the other bending toward France—their
approaches held as much similarity as difference. Washington was no
isolationist, despite a superficial reading of his much-quoted “Farewell
Address,” which warned against entangling alliances. And Jefferson’s
vision of an emerging “empire of liberty,” with a limited government
and no standing armies, can hardly be updated into a modern leviathan
carrying out a “regional war.” Far from being symbols for isolationism
versus idealistic crusades, respectively, both understood the late 18thcentury order as one in which leaders pursued their nation’s interests
within a framework of balance of power. Both calculated not only what
might be good, but what might be possible within the nation’s limited
means. Washington warned against “entangling alliances” because
they might restrict his nation’s ability to react flexibly within a balance
of world power. Jefferson, although generally a proponent of a rather
limited central government, jumped at the opportunity to purchase
the Louisiana Territory when European rivalries provided the opportunity to do through diplomacy what could not have been attempted
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by force. The classic studies of early U.S. diplomacy all emphasize this
so-called “interests of the state” approach.4
Although I do want to highlight the absurdity of turning Washington and Jefferson into trans-historical symbols that will frame a policy
argument for regime change in Iran, I do not want to promote a discussion of “original intent” among the Founding Fathers. Frankly, what
gems of wisdom might be gained from either Jefferson or Washington
are really beside the point because of the United States’ very different
status in the world now, as Dr. Ferguson pointed out. Questionable
characterizations of Founding Fathers, however, only begin the fairytale version of history to which we have been treated.
Ledeen has suggested that through most of our history we were isolated by oceans. He writes, “we really didn’t think much about the rest
of the world.” I would first ask who is the “we”? It is a rhetorical category used without introspection or examination throughout Ledeen’s
essay. Then I would respond: “didn’t think much”—except for buying Louisiana from France; jockeying to acquire territory from Spain;
entering into a century of battles and treaties with Native American
“nations” (which Ledeen apparently does not include in his conceptualization of “the world”); entering difficult negotiations with Britain to
gain Oregon; snatching one-third of the territory of Mexico; opening
Japan to commerce; moving to block European expansion in the western hemisphere; seizing colonies and protectorates from other colonial
powers and from their own independence movements; trying to mediate the war between England and Germany in 1915 and 1916; working
out a vision for a League of Nations; encouraging massive private
lending to stabilize Germany (and thus Europe) in the early 1920s; and
so on. The United States has always been in the world and actively so.
The idea that vast oceans, crisscrossed by trade, produced some splendid isolationism in policy is simply not supportable. Expansionism is
the heart of U.S. policy during its first century and a half, and nations
do not overspread a continent and several colonial acquisitions without “thinking about the world.” The idea that empires grow in fits of
absentmindedness has, I should think, long ago been put to rest.5
Next, Ledeen states that the U.S. system is not designed to conduct
foreign policy. There is much that is insightful in this analysis, for U.S.
policy does frequently exhibit dysfunction and fragmentation. Still,
highlighting U.S. incompetence and weakness leads to a framework
in which, he claims, the United States never seeks war or influence but
is always forced into it by an attack. U.S. history, in this view, is a rep-
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etitious replay of an unprepared innocent that invites attack because
of its weakness and incompetence.6 “Whenever a war is over, we dismantle our military establishment,” he claims, and set ourselves up
for another “sucker punch.” Although the United States did champion
military disarmament (not just for itself but for the world) in the Washington Treaties and other agreements at the end of World War I, the
pattern hardly holds in other 20th-century cases such as World War II,
Korea, or Vietnam. If I were asked to describe U.S. military power and
capabilities in the half-century since 1945, “dismantled” would not be
the first descriptor to come to mind. Having rhetorically disarmed the
United States, however, Ledeen can suggest that the United States is
always weak, defensive, and under attack by bullies. Our government,
he laments, does not have the “blank check” to spend on the military
that other countries enjoy, nor can it operate with secrecy or a compliant media. This “underdog” interpretation fails to explain the dramatic
growth of U.S. power in the world or explore how it is exercised.
He clinches his argument about perennial U.S. weakness by saying that the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran inaugurated a war against
the United States by terrorists. He deplores the fact that it has taken
the United States over twenty years to respond. This example gets to
the crux of the problem with his analysis—seeing mainly U.S. weakness, not U.S. strength. To present the Iranian Revolution primarily as
a sucker punch against the United States leaves out a lot of relevant
detail. Whatever one thinks of the Islamic fundamentalist regime that
came to power in 1979, it was swept in by Islamic radicals who were
able to lead a massive popular uprising, partly because of twenty-five
years of U.S. support for Shah Reza Pahlavi’s regime, which, especially
in its latter years, brutalized its people while richly rewarding U.S.
oil and military contractors. The U.S. and British covert action that
installed the Shah in 1953 by supplying money and media strategies
(just the kind of interventionism that Ledeen now wants to repeat)
helped give rise to Islamic militancy in Iran and shaped the crisis of
1979 as an act of revenge against U.S. manipulations. I would argue
that the Iranian revolution arose not from U.S. weakness or its disorganized policies, but from the secretive, interventionist, and humanrights-be-damned tactics that the U.S. exercised during the Cold War
in the name of keeping communism at bay in the oil-rich Gulf region.7

89

Macalester International

Vol. 16

*****
Ledeen’s notion that the United States responded weakly to terrorism
after 1979 needs to be examined in another context as well. During the
1980s, the United States allied with radical Islamic terrorists because
they provided the best fighting brigades for rolling back the communist regime in Afghanistan. I agree that the United States failed
to check the spread of radical Islamic terrorists; worse yet, it actually funded them. The Carter and Reagan administrations, fearing
to appear weak, engaged in standing up strongly to communism by
sending money, weapons, and electronic equipment to any non-communist group they could find, including those we now call terrorists.8
The strategy of regime change by supplying covert assistance to the
enemies of our enemies, used by the United States both in Iran in 1953
and in Afghanistan during the 1980s, has a track record that needs
more careful examination.
Ledeen bypasses such complications with his assertion that the
growth of hate and terrorism in the Middle East is simply unrelated to
U.S. policies. In his view, the rise of anger against the United States is
not fuelled by dominance over oil riches, support for abusive dictatorships, a growing military footprint on Islamic soil, seemingly unquestioned support of Israeli policies, or now a botched occupation of Iraq.
Rather, anger grows out of Middle Easterners’ own failures, coupled
with U.S. weakness and “our” Jeffersonian impulses to spread freedom.
That observation suggests my second concern: unrealistic policymaking. What seems so remarkable about Ledeen’s essay, in addition to its cavalier approach to the uses of history, is its utopianism,
a quality that runs precisely counter to the more hard-headed, realist
approaches of either Washington or Jefferson or even to the traditions that Ledeen himself invokes with approval. In a recent article,
even Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History and the Last Man,
warned against the utopianism involved in the projects of those advocating “transformation” in the Middle East through hard-line policies
and regime change.9
It should be acknowledged that Ledeen strikes a posture in which
he critiques policy utopianism. He suggests that he knows that power
is what really runs the world and states that the United States needs
to be more deliberate in its application. The subtext here, from this
author of a book on Machiavelli, is that he is a realist, unlike the rest of
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us who oscillate between being foolish isolationists and endearing but
fuzzy-headed moralistic crusaders. He clearly wishes we would get to
the business of building strength and checking the power of unfriendly
governments whenever they challenge us.
But to quote David Riesman, “this way of being realistic may have
nothing to do with reality.”10 Grand historical narratives about exceptional history, Founding Fathers, and the United States’ perennial military weaknesses cannot mask Ledeen’s failure to map out how his
recommended overthrow in Iran might actually work in the real world.
Where is the evidence that his shadowy tactic for regime change would
stand a chance? Where is his sense of balance of power, of proportionality, of alliance building, of “blowback,” of the limits of power? Where
is his assessment of the poor planning and execution of policy in Iraq
in 2003 and of the regional consequences of U.S. blunders? Where is
the hallmark of realist analysis—a careful judgment of whether the
means available can possibly meet the desired ends? Some Iranians
may have stood by in 1953 and watched a U.S.- and British-led coup
manipulate their political process and their oil, but what could possibly make one think they would all stand by and allow a second such
manipulation? There is, of course, a democracy movement in Iran,
but would it be furthered or set back by a possibly clumsy attempt to
manipulate the country’s culture and politics? Iran’s nuclear program
represents an enormous foreign policy challenge for the United States,
but will strident public rhetoric about spreading “freedom” through
various covert techniques help or hurt? Realists would more carefully
address a calculation of diplomatic means rather than feed abstract,
moralistic calls to fulfill “America’s mission.”11
Advancing utopian visions, Ledeen does not weigh how the U.S.
might succeed against an anti-Western insurgency in his “regional
war,” where the U.S. government has so little cultural and linguistic
competence and where the economic stakes are so high because of oil
dependency. His way of avoiding the complications of intervention
is simply to say that it is ethnocentric to assume that Islamic people cannot learn democracy and freedom and become like the West.
Therefore, warnings that they will not welcome U.S.-sponsored regime
change cannot rightly be raised. Eastern Europe, with its very different
history, becomes his default historical lesson for the “they-will-alwayswelcome-us-with-hearts-and-flowers” view.
But history does not teach lessons. Rather, it helps provide perspectives. It complicates rather than simplifies. Other speakers have
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pointed to the relevance, in the run-up to the Iraqi War, of understanding the British role in Iraq in the 1920s, or the U.S. pacification of the
Philippines just after the turn of the century, or the interactive spiral
that develops between foreign occupation and local insurgencies. History should not be a rummage pile into which policy analysts can
grope and grab simplistic analogies for policy justifications. Examining diverse histories and diverse historical analogies should provoke
questions, not answers: What contingencies need to be studied; what
unintended consequences considered; what dissents heard and discussed?12
*****
Dr. Ledeen’s essay is, in short, deeply troubling for its talk of America’s
exceptional mission, its manipulation of the past, and its confusion of
moral stance with on-the-ground policy planning. Ledeen has provided a textbook case of the rhetoric of empire. It articulates universalism and reimagines a fairy-tale history of innocence. It sets up the
nation as hero of its own global narrative of light and darkness. And
it hears no other stories. Such imperial hubris without realistic assessment of risk may breed militarism and financial crises and lead to
various nightmare scenarios, some of which the other two speakers
addressed at length.
There is a debate in the land as to whether people of Ledeen’s persuasion are true believers in their utopian visions and their apparently
utopian means of achieving them (with a few radios and some tough
talk). Or are they hard-headed realists who seek to entrench U.S. influence in the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf regions, and who develop
elaborate moralistic cover to sell the power politics and interventions
they see as essential to forging a so-called New American Century?
I do not have the answer to this debate. Ledeen’s formulation of a
zealous “American Mission,” together with his alarming claim that it
would be cheap and easy to manipulate a regime change in Iran, however, should be challenged on grounds of both history and policy.
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